Reviews the Intelligence Community's analytic performance during the chaotic Vietnam era, with particular focus on the efforts of CIA analysts. Offers a candid view of the CIA's intelligence assessments concerning Vietnam during three episodes between 1962 and 1968 and the reactions of senior U.S. policymakers to those assessments. Shows that CIA analysts had a firm grasp of the situation in Vietnam and expressed doubts that heightened U.S. military pressure alone could win the war. Contrary to the opinions voiced by Robert McNamara and others, this volume illustrates the expertise CIA officers brought to the Vietnam question. Photos.
"This document will be available on the internet at www.odci.gov/csi"--P. iv
Includes bibliographical references and index
Distortions of intelligence : the effort to begin withdrawing U. S. military personal from Vietnam (1962-1963) -- CIA judgements on President Johnson's decision to "go big" in Vietnam -- Prelude : the overthrow of President Ngo Dihn Diem (1963-1965) -- CIA, the order-of-battle controversy, and the Tet Offensive 91967-1978) -- Lessons to be learned about the intelligence/policymaking relationship